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Froud v. Celotex Corp.: Rebirth of an Adage
THoMAs F. LONDPJAN*
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1982, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois
appeared to put an end to the old adage: "[A] s far as liability for
punitive damages is concerned, it continued to be cheaper to kill
people rather than to merely injure them."' In Froud v. Celotex
Corp.,2 the appellate court concluded that the Survival Act 3 was
a "neutral vehicle" and did not authorize or prohibit the award
of punitive damages. 4 Justice Lorenz, writing for the majority,
interpreted the Survival Act to provide that common law actions
that establish the right to a punitive damage award survived the
death of the injured person.5 In another 1982 decision, Howe v.
Clark Equipment Co. ,6 the appellate court for the fourth district
also construed the Survival Act as a "conduit" and allowed recovery of punitive damages. 7 The Illinois Supreme Court, however, granted the petition for leave to appeal in the Froud case
* L.L.B., University of Illinois, 1962. Mr. Londrigan is presently a partner of the law firm Londrigan, Potter & Randle, P.C., Springfield, Illinois,
specializing in civil trial and appellate practice. He has served as Chairman
of the Civil Practice and Procedure Council of the Illinois State Bar Association and Co-chairman of the Uniform Circuit Court Rules Committee. He
is the immediate past President of the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.
1. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 IM.App. 3d 654, 657, 437 N.E.2d 910, 912
2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
(1982), rev'd, 98 Ill.
2d 324, 456
2. 107 IlM. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982), rev'd, 98 Ill.
N.E.2d 131 (1983).
3. Illinois Probate Act § 27-6, IL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2, § 27-6 (1983)
provides:
[I]n addition to the actions which survive by the common law, the following also survive: actions of replevin, actions to recover damages for
an injury to the person (except slander and libel), actions to recover
damages for an injury to real or personal property or for the detention
or conversion of personal property, actions against officers for misfeasance, malfeasance, nonfeasance of themselves or their deputies, actions for fraud or deceit, and actions provided in Section 6-21 of "An Act
relating to alcoholic liquors."
4. Froud, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 437 N.E.2d at 913.
5. Id.
6. 104 Ml1. App. 3d 45, 432 N.E.2d 621 (1982).
7. Id. at 50, 432 N.E.2d at 625. The Howe court commented that "the
Survival Act is only a conduit whereby any causes of action possessed by
the decedent may be prosecuted by his personal representative.. . ." Id.
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and reversed the appellate court.8 In the year and a half interim,
the law in Illinois appeared to be the statutory construction
placed upon the Survival Act by the appellate court decisions in
Froud and Howe.

On behalf of a unanimous supreme court, Justice Simon
reconciled several recent cases that appeared to express divergent interpretations of the Survival Act.9 The court acknowledged the applicability of the "cheaper to kill" adage and
accorded recognition to the persuasiveness of the arguments
against it. The court determined, however, that as "[pIersuasive
as these arguments sound, we believe they are better addressed
to the General Assembly than to this court .... 10
The Froud decision was based solely on principles of statutory construction. Justice Simon marshalled strong and cogent
arguments to reconcile prior cases construing the Wrongful
Death Act,'1 the Survival Act and the Public Utilities Act. 12 One
of the cases distinguished was National Bank of Bloomington v.
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. ,13 which allowed the plaintiff to
use the Survival Act to preserve a statutory cause of action for
punitive damages expressly provided for in the Public Utilities
Act. 14 The Froud court noted that the rationale of the National
Bank of Bloomington decision was based upon a "comprehensive regulatory scheme" enacted by the legislature and, therefore, not subject to the common law rule of abatement by
death. 15 The court in National Bank of Bloomington, determined that to construe the Public Utilities Act in any other man8. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324,456 N.E.2d 131 (1983). It is inter-

esting to note that the court held the Froudpetition in abeyance for several
terms.
9. Froud, 98 MI. 2d at 330-33, 456 N.E.2d at 133-35.
10. Id. at 335, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
11. Illinois Wrongful Death Act §1, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1983)
provides:
[W]henever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death
had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every such case
the person who ...would have been liable if death had not ensued,
shall be liable to an action for damages....
12. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-117-1 (1983); id. ch. 111 2/3, § 1-808 (1983).
13. 73 M11.
2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978).
14. Id. at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924.
15. Froud, 98 Ill. 2d at 334, 456 N.E.2d at 135. The court commented that:
That claim is an integral component of the regulatory scheme and of
the remedy which is available under it: it can no more be diminished by
common law doctrines such as abatement than a statutory limitations
period can be eroded by such equitable doctrines as tolling. [citations
omitted] The Public Utilities Act is a regulatory statute, and the punitive damages provision is part and parcel of the Act.
Id. (emphasis added).
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ner than upholding the punitive damages provision, would
frustrate the Act's intention. The other interpretation, in the
eyes of the court, would allow reprehensible conduct to be isolated from punitive liability merely because it was so severe that
16
it resulted in death.
In Froud, the rationale of the unanimous opinion was the
court's judicial duty to consistently interpret separate statutes
in view of the common law doctrine of abatement. These statutes, the Wrongful Death Act and the Survival Act, are legislative enactments designed to mitigate the recognized inequity of
the common law rule of abatement by death.' 7 The Froud court
acknowledged the inequity of common law abatement but
seemed to suggest that existing statutes may have preempted
common law solutions. 18 According to the court, one such statute is the Survival Act. This act affords the party relief in instances where the common law rule of nonsurvival would have
denied recovery. 19 The Froud court determined that this relief
was limited to those areas specified in the Act.20 The court declined "'to annex new provisions or substitute different ones, or
provide exceptions, limitations or conditions which are different
than the plain meaning of the statute.' "21 Therefore, the inequity created by common law abatement has been only partially
eliminated by the legislature.
The purpose of this article is to examine parallel lines of Illinois Supreme Court decisions dealing with death damages; one
line of cases deals with statutory construction and the other
deals with the common law rule of abatement by death. In cases
of statutory construction, the Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected judicial expansion of legislative remedies. In cases
brought at common law, however, the court has often reversed
precedent inconsistent with contemporary principles of justice.
This article addresses the unanswered issues of the continued
viability of the common law rule of abatement by death and the
right to recover punitive damages when appended to an independent common law action for family expenses recognized
16. National Bank of Bloomingdale, 73 Ill. 2d at 174, 383 N.E.2d at 924.
17. The appellate court in Froud noted that common law abatement was
the source of the adage when the court commented: "The common law rule
is that actions for 'personal torts' abate at the death of the injured person.
[citations omitted]. This common law rule is the source of the old adage
that it was cheaper to kill people rather than to merely injure them."
Froud, 107 Ill. App. 3d at 657, 437 N.E.2d at 912.
18. Froud, 98 Ill. 2d at 335-36, 456 N.E.2d at 136-37.
19. See supra note 3.
20. Froud, 98 Ill. 2d at 334-35, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
21. Id. at 334, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
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by our supreme court in Saunders v. Schultz. 22
INTERPRETATION OF THE SURVIVAL ACT

The scope of damages recoverable under these remedial
statutes has been subject to repeated court interpretations dating back to the 1882 decision of Holton v. Daly.23 Ten years ago,
the Illinois Supreme Court traced the history of damages recoverable under the Survival Act in Murphy v. Martin Oil Co. 24 In
Murphy, the supreme court allowed recovery under the Survival
Act for "pain and suffering. ' 25 The Murphy court expressed its
disfavor of the common law rule of abatement and noted that
the modern trend maintained that a tort cause of action was not
extinguished at death.26 The Murphy court then expressly overruled the rule in Holton 27 which proclaimed that the Survival
Act allowed survival of an action only when death resulted from
28
a cause other than the act which caused the original injury.
The court determined that it did not have to blindly follow prior
decisions when to do so would require the court to ignore public
29
policy and social needs.
In Murphy, the court dealt directly with the inequity created
by the common law doctrine of abatement by death and the rule
of law that the Wrongful Death Act was "an exclusive remedy."
In Froud, the court simply construed the express terms of the
Survival Act. Froud was concerned with the failure of the legislature to amend either the Wrongful Death or Survival Act to
allow the recovery of punitive damages. In Froud, the court juxtaposed the appellate and supreme court decisions in the case of
Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co .30 with the legislative his31
tory of the Survival Act.
After the appellate court in Mattyasovszky refused to grant
punitive damages, 32 a bill was introduced in the General Assem22. 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
23. 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
24. 56 Ill.
2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
25. Id. at 432, 308 N.E.2d at 587.
26. Id. at 428-29, 308 N.E.2d at 585.
27. Id. at 430-31, 308 N.E.2d at 586-87. Actually, Holton had been over-

ruled in Saunders v. Schultz, 20 11. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960) (funeral and

medical expenses recovered under the Survival Act).
28. Holton v. Daly, 106 IM. 131, 137 (1882).
29. The court noted that it is more important to be correct on reconsideration of various principles of law than to be consistent with previous declarations. Murphy, 56 Ill.
2d at 431, 308 N.E.2d at 587.

30. 21 Ill.
App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), affd, 61 Ill.
2d 31, 330 N.E.2d

509 (1975).
31. Froud, 98 Ill.
2d at 335-36, 456 N.E.2d at 136-37 (1983).

32. Mattyasovszky, 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 55, 313 N.E.2d 496, 502 (1974).
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bly to amend the Survival Act. The bill proposed that a punitive
damages award be included in the damages that survive the
death of the party.33 The committee it was referred to defeated
the bill. Accordingly, Froud relied heavily upon stare decisis as
a basis of resolving the question of statutory construction. Contrary to the rationale expressed in Murphy, 34 the Froud court
determined that it was not free to abandon its own earlier statutory interpretations. The court declared that "[cI onsiderations
of stare decisis weigh more heavily in the area of statutory construction. . ..
The predicate for the statutory interpretation
in Froud was Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co.36 Mattyasovszky was decided only one year after Murphy and clearly
rejected a statutory interpretation of the Survival Act to include
punitive damages. The court in Mattyasovszky determined that
the earlier case of Murphy did not indicate any basis for a
change in the law which had been present in Illinois for more
than a hundred years. 37 Mattyasovszky also rejected creation of
a separate common law wrongful death action which could serve
as a vehicle to include punitive damages. In light of the remedial action taken by the legislature in the Survival Act and the
Wrongful Death Act, the court found there was no need to create
an additional common law action for "wrongful death." 38 It is
interesting to note that since 1975, the Illinois General Assembly
has not shown an inclination to address the "cheaper to kill" adage or change the inherent common law inequity of abatement
by death with which Illinois reviewing courts have struggled
over the past century.
"35

FROUD AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

It is now clear that the supreme court has rejected the "neutral vehicle" or "conduit" concepts of the Survival Act adopted
by the appellate courts in Froud v. Celotex Corp.39 and Howe v.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See Froud, 98 Ill.
2d at 335-36, 456 N.E.2d at 136-37.
See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
Froud, 98 Ill. 2d at 336, 456 N.E.2d at 137.
61 1n. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).

37. Id. at 33, 330 N.E.2d at 510.
38. Id. at 37, 330 N.E.2d at 512. The court noted:
The single occurrence involved in the case before us already gives rise
to two distinct statutory actions: in one the damages recovered go to
the decedent's estate, and so are available to the claims of creditors,
and in the other the damages recovered go to the surviving spouse and
next of kin of the deceased.

Id.
39. 107 Ill. App. 3d 654, 437 N.E.2d 910 (1982), rev'd, 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456
N.E.2d 131 (1983).
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Clark Equipment Co. 4° While several issues have now been
conclusively resolved, others have yet to be addressed. First,
Froud clearly reaffirmed Mattyasovszky's holding that the Survival Act does not preserve a common law claim for punitive
damages against abatement by death and also rejected the invitation to create a separate common law action for wrongful
death.4 1 Second, Froud reconciled National Bank of Bloomington and Mattyasovszky by holding that existing statutory actions providing for recovery of punitive damages, such as the
Public Utilities Act, were preserved against common law abatement by death.4 Third, Froud recognized the desirability of a
uniform application of punitive damages regardless of whether
the victim is injured, or later dies as a result of the injuries, but
43
left resolution of that issue to the Illinois General Assembly.
Froud, however, failed to address the issue of whether to abrogate the remaining vestiges of the common law rule of abatement by death. Since the Survival Act was pleaded as a
statutory vehicle or conduit to recover punitive damages, rules
of statutory construction dictated the result.
The Illinois Supreme Court has struggled for several generations with the competing philosophies of conforming the common law to basic notions of equality and fairness in light of
contemporary values, as opposed to judicial recognition that the
legislature is the basic formulator of public policy as expressed
through statutory enactment. The Illinois Supreme Court in
Froud clearly concluded that the legislature has enacted death
statutes which fail to provide for punitive damages. Despite this
obvious inequity, Froud concluded that the court is powerless to
amend these statutes by judicial interpretation." The basic rea40. 104 Ill. App. 3d 45, 432 N.E.2d 621 (1982).

41.
42.
43.
44.

Froud, 98

Ill. 2d at 336, 456 N.E.2d at 136-37.
Id. at 334-35, 456 N.E.2d at 136.
Id. at 335, 456 N.E.2d at 137.
Id. The Illinois Supreme Court has expressed divergent views with

respect to stare decisis in cases involving the common law as compared to

cases of statutory construction. Compare Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.
2d 423, 431-32, 308 N.E.2d 583, 587 (1974) (the doctrine of stare decisis retains

the flexibility needed to respond to the dictates of public policy and social
need)and Saunders v. Schultz, 20 IlM. 2d 301, 311, 170 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1960)
(permitted common law suit for funeral and medical expenses)and Molitor
v. Kaneland Comm. Unit Dist. No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26, 163 N.E.2d 89, 96

(1959), (moral, economic and social welfare of people can be grounds for

eviating from strict adherence to stare decisis), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 968
(1962), with Susemiehl v. Red River Lumber Co., 376 Il1. 138, 140, 33 N.E.2d
211, 212 (1941) (policy expressed through a long standing rule can only be
changed through legislative enactment)and Mattyasovszky v. West Towns
Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 52, 313 N.E.2d 496, 501 (1974) (distinguished Saunders while strictly following common law).
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son for this inequity,the common law rule of abatement by
death, however, was not addressed.
FROUD AND THE COMMON LAw

One undeniable pattern woven into the text of all Illinois
appellate decisions is the inherent unfairness of a rule where
punitive damages are abated by death. Recent decisions by Illinois reviewing courts have all commented on the basic injustice
46
of such a rule. 45 In Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Railway,
the supreme court acknowledged the basic injustice which results from denying punitive damages when the victim of a tort
dies. The court noted that "[elvidence has demonstrated that
multiple and varied wrongs result from reducing a claim for
compensatory and punitive damages to a claim for compensatory damages only because death has intervened. '4 7 The court
determined that since the cheaper to kill than injure adage was
a product of the legislature, it was not the court's function to
rewrite it.4
The same "adage" and similar judicial comments are found
repeatedly in other cases. Justice Moran for the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District in Mattyasovszky v. West
Towns Bus Co. ,49 stated that allowing punitive damages "would
once and for all put to rest the old adage that it is cheaper to kill
your victim than to leave him maimed."5 0 Both the appellate
and supreme courts in Froud noted the presence of the adage.
The supreme court concluded that as persuasive as the arguments are against the cheaper to kill theory, it was powerless to
judicially amend a legislative enactment. 51
45. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509, 513 (1975)
(Goldenhersh, J., dissenting); Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 Ill. App. 3d 654,

437 N.E.2d 910 (1982); Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d
46, 313 N.E.2d 496, 502 (1974).
46. E.g., Churchill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., No. 49421, slip op. at 6 (Ill. Sept.
1977), rev'd on rehearing,73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 141, 383 NE.2d at 935.
49. 21 Ill. App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), rev'd, 61 111. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d
509 (1975).
50. Id. at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502. The dissent in Mattyasovszky referred to
Justice Moran's statement by commenting: "I agree with the statement of
the appellate court that a construction of our survival statute which did not
preclude recovery of punitive damages 'would once and for all put to rest
the old adage that it is cheaper to kill your victim than to leave him
maimed.'" Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 111. 2d 31, 38, 330
N.E.2d 509, 513 (1975) (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
51. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 98 Ill. 2d 334-35, 456 N.E.2d 131, 136 (1983).
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While Illinois courts have struggled with reconciling a consistent statutory scheme between the Wrongful Death Act and
Survival Act, the supreme court has not experienced the same
problem with common law rules which are obviously unfair or
illogical. For example, for many years the rule of Holton v.
Daly5 2 held that the Wrongful Death Act and Survival Act were
exclusive remedies in the event of a death. In 1941, the Illinois
Supreme Court reaffirmed the Holton rule in Susemiehl v. Red
River Lumber Co.,5 3 despite strong policy arguments that it

should be overruled.5 4 The court noted that other jurisdictions
had reached a different result,5 5 but declined to change the rule.

This holding, according to the court, was based on the principle
of stare decisis. The court declared that the Holton rule has
been the law for nearly sixty years and that countless Illinois
courts had followed it.5 6

Therefore, if the rule was to be

57
changed, it must be by legislative enactment.
Nineteen years later the Illinois Supreme Court, however,
overruled Holton in Saunders v. Schultz.5 8 The court considered
that "[allmost a score of years [had] passed since this pronouncement without legislative action in this field. The estate

or the spouse ...

are entitled to recover for pecuniary losses

suffered by either or both which are not recoverable under the
Wrongful Death Act .... ,,59 The concept of common law abatement in Illinois was strictly limited by the Saunders decision
and the rule that the Wrongful Death Act was the exclusive statutory remedy for death actions was rejected. The Supreme
Court in Saunders recognized a direct common law action for
death damages not recoverable by statute. The court considered
that "[t] he rule denying such recovery originated as a corollary
52. 106 Ill. 131 (1882).
53. 376 Ill. 138, 33 N.E.2d 211 (1941).

54. Id. at 140, 33 N.E.2d at 212.
55. Id. The court noted that
[b]eginning with the case of Holton v. Daly [citations omitted] and
continuing to the present time, this court has been committed to the
doctrine that if death results from the injuries sued for, the suit of the
injured person abates and cannot be further prosecuted. We have construed the Injuries act to apply to all those cases in which the injuries
resulted in death, and the Survival Statute to apply to those cases in
which death resulted from some other cause. The appellant argues
with much force, and with numerous authorities from other jurisdictions, that the rule of Holton v. Daly [citations omitted] should be over-

ruled and that decisions from other jurisdictions having similar statutes
should be followed.
Id. at 138, 140, 33 N.E.2d at 212.

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 20 Ill. 2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
59. Id. at 311, 170 N.E.2d at 169.
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of the archaic common-law rule that there could be no recovery
'
for the death of a human being which is no longer the law . 60
Furthermore, the surviving spouse is personally liable for the
debts incurred as a result of the death under the Family Expense Statute. This burden, according to the court, should fall
upon the tortfeasor which caused the liability, rather than the
61
innocent victim.
The Illinois Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the Saunders rationale for an independent common law cause of action
in Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Railway.62 Therefore, it is
now clear that the rule of Holton v. Daly,63 that the Wrongful
Death Act is the exclusive remedy, has been expressly overruled on three separate occasions by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 64 It is also clear that Saunders created a direct and independent common law recovery of damages, not provided for
by the Wrongful Death Act. It is important to note, however,
that subsequent opinions have been careful to point out that the
supreme court will not create a duplicative common law action
for wrongful death which includes the same damages already
provided to the next of kin by statute.
The action recognized by Saunders was independent of the
statutory cause of action provided under the Wrongful Death
Act. Saunders provided a common law recovery for damages
separate and distinct from damages already recoverable by statute. The supreme court determined that the plaintiffs claim
would not result in a duplication of damages, as the Wrongful
Death Act did not provide for recovery of medical or funeral
expenses. 65
The "Norfolk Cases"
National Bank of Bloomington v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. ,66 and Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co. ,67
are discussed interchangeably as the "Norfolk Cases" by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In Re Air Crash Disaster
Near Chicago, I1. 68 Churchill and National Bank of Blooming60. Id. at 310, 170 N.E.2d at 168 (emphasis added).

61. Id.
62. 73 Ill.
2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978).
63. 106 Ill.
131 (1882).
64. Churchill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978);
Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974); Saunders v.
Schultz, 20 Ill.
2d 301, 170 N.E.2d 163 (1960).
65. Saunders, 20 Ill. 2d at 311-12, 170 N.E.2d at 169.
66. 73 Ill.
2d 160, 383 N.E.2d 919 (1978).
67. 73 IlI. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978).
68. 644 F.2d 594, 605-06 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ton, however, were pleaded as entirely different causes of action. NationalBank of Bloomington alleged an action under the
Survival Act for pain and suffering caused before the ensuing
death. 69 This action was the same type as in Murphy.70 Churchill, although brought pursuant to the Public Utilities Act, alleged
the same common law damages for family expenses, as in
Saunders.71
In Churchill, the decedent died instantaneously and had no
claim for "pain and suffering" under the Survival Act. Therefore, the court based the compensatory damage award on the
independent common law action recognized in Saunders.72 The
similarity between the "Norfolk" claims was the request for punitive damages for willful violation of the Public Utilities Act.
The basis for recovery of compensatory damages under the
two cases was quite distinct. National Bank of Bloomington
sought damages for pain and suffering under a statute, the Survival Act. Churchill sought punitive damages provided under
the Public Utilities Act; however, it pleaded the same compensatory damages recoverable at the common law. Recovery of compensatory damages in a Saunders claim is separate and apart
from damages recoverable under either the Wrongful Death Act
or the Survival Act.
The distinction between these two cases was discussed by
one commentator contemporaneously with the "Norfolk" decisions. The commentator explained:
In Churchill, where the decedent died instantly, the Court allowed
punitive damages on a separate action by the widow which she had
filed for hospital, medical and funeral expenses under the theory of
Saunders v. Schultz. (citations omitted)
According to Thomas F. Londrigan, one of the counsel in the
Churchill case, "Churchill and the First NationalBank cases leave
unanswered the situation where the next of kin has sustained
"very real damages" under the Family Expense Statute (as interpreted by Schultz), and asserts a right to recover punitive damages
in an independent common law tort action. Mattyasovszky appears
to hold that the administrator has no right to assert such a claim,
where the death is "instantaneous," under either the Wrongful
Death Act or Survival Statute. However, does a next of kin or administrator have the right to claim funeral expenses and punitive
damages in a Saunders v. Schultz type action... ? These types of
actions will be determined
by common law principles rather than
73
statutory interpretation."
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

National Bank of Bloomington, 73 Ill. 2d at 166, 383 N.E.2d at 923.
See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
Churchill, 73 Ill. 2d at 133, 383 N.E.2d at 931.
Id. at 138-39, 383 N.E.2d at 934.
24 TRiAL BrEF 1, 1-2 (January 1979) (emphasis in original).
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What was suggested five years ago was that interpretation of
statutory death actions does not answer the remaining dilemma
caused by the common law vestiges of abatement by death. The
adage "it is cheaper to kill" must ultimately be resolved by judicial re-examination of its source, the common law rule of abatement by death.
The best discussion of the origin and history of the rule of
abatement by death is found in Justice Moran's opinion for the
appellate court in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. 74 According to Justice Moran, there are two common law rules which
are pertinent. The first rule is "that a plaintiff may not complain
of the death of another as causing injury to him.

'75

The basis for

this rule is found in the common law which holds that the pecuniary value of a life is unascertainble. 76 Thus, it is impossible to
award damages. The second common law rule that Justice Moran considered in Mattyasovszky was "that personal actions
abate with death of the injured party.177 The origin of the abatement rule was the early English law.78 The Mattyasovszky court
noted that except for the limited action for pecuniary loss in
Saunders, the common law remains the same. 79 The court then
decided Mattyasovszky as a case of "statutory construction" 80
and determined that punitive damages were not recoverable.
This decision was reached despite contrary construction
placed upon similar statutes in sister states, and judicial recognition that both logic and fairness required a different result.
Justice Moran noted that "[i] n addition to deterring others from
wilful and wanton misconduct, it would bring death actions into
complete harmony with the general body of law governing other
types of tortious conduct. 8 1x Although the appellate court conceded that logically the estate is entitled to punitive damages,it
App. 3d 46, 313 N.E.2d 496 (1974), rev'd, 61 Ill. 2d 31, 330 N.E.2d
74. 21 Ill.
509 (1975).
75. Id. at 51, 313 N.E.2d at 500. See also Crane v. C. &W. .R. R., 233 Ill.

259, 84 N.E. 222 (1908).
76. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1099 (1808). Lord Ellenborough
stated in Baker that "[i] n a civil court, the death of a human being could not
be complained of as an injury; and in this case the damages as to the plain-

tiff's wife must stop with the period of her existence." Id. But see Holdsworth, The Origin of the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 LAw Q. REV.431 (1916).
App. 3d at 51, 313 N.E.2d at 500 (1974). See also
77. Mattyasovszky, 21 Ill.
594 (1875) (at common law, the action for perMurphy v. McGrath, 79 Ill.
sonal injury would have abated on the death of the plaintiff before final
judgment).
78. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1043, 1044
(1965).
79. Mattyasovszky, 21 Ill. App. 3d at 52, 313 N.E.2d 500 (1974).
80. Id. at 53, 313 N.E.2d at 501.

81. Id. at 54, 313 N.E.2d at 502.
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refused to consider the matter on any grounds other than statutory construction. Justice Moran stated, "[d]espite our highest
desires, however, law is not always based upon logical rationale.
The survival action for damages for injury to the person is a
creature of statute and the intent of the legislature, as expressed
in the statute, is controlling." 82 Both the appellate court and the
supreme court in Mattyasovszky, construed the Survival Act
strictly to deny recovery of punitive damages. Froud v. Celotex
Corp.83 simply reaffirms Mattyasovszky on exactly the same
ground, statutory construction.
Progeny of the "Norfolk Cases"
The progeny of National Bank of Bloomington have been
extinguished by a rule of strict statutory construction of the Survival Act. The fate of the progeny of Churchill, however, are still
being ruled upon by the lower courts. The progeny of Churchill
are in reality direct descendants of Saunders and the common
law. As children of the common law, their fate must be determined by the continued viability of the common law doctrine of
abatement by death and not by legislative inaction. It can be
argued that abatement by death does not apply in a Saunders
common law action because the individual asserting the claim
does so directly in an individual capacity. Saunders created a
direct common law cause of action in a person other than the
decedent. The Saunders court based the cause of action on the
right to recover "the very real damages" that the surviving
spouse was liable for under the Family Expense Act. 84 Since
the plaintiff was personally liable for these "very real damages"
as a result of the defendant's conduct, 85 independent standing
existed to assert this claim. The plaintiff in Saunders was not
suing as representative of the estate, but rather directly for his
86
own independent injury.
Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Railway 87 followed the
Saunders court and treated such damages as separate from the
person suffering "physical injury". In Churchill, the court refused to hold that the physically injured party was the only person affected by the tortfeasor. According to the court, "a person
'affected' by a wrongful act is one who shows a direct personal
interest in the matter as opposed to one whose interest is
82. Id.

83. 98 Ill.
2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
84. Saunders, 20 IM.2d at 310, 170 N.E.2d at 168.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 73 Ill.
2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978).
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'88
merely in common with that of the general public.
It is important to understand that it was these separate, distinct and direct damages which gave the spouse independent
"standing" to assert her claim under the Public Utilities Statute
in Churchill. A Saunders action is direct and personal. Therefore, it is difficult to argue that common law abatement by death
should apply since the person damaged has independent standing to institute the lawsuit.
Certainly Churchill cannot be cited as holding that the
supreme court has already recognized a common law claim for
punitive damages. Justice Moran, in the recent opinion of Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp.,89 determined that
there was no right to punitive damages in a common law loss of
consortium claim because the claim is "indirect" or derivative.
In Hammond, the supreme court claimed that its opinion in
Churchill clearly emphasized that the allowance for punitive
damages was based solely on the legislative intent of the Public
Utilities Act.90 The Churchill opinion therefore, "should not be
interpreted as either condemning or advancing recovery of punitive damages in tort cases." 9' According to Hammond, the rationale of a loss of consortium award is solely to compensate the
spouse for his indirect or derivative injury.
The issue in Hammond was decided by the supreme court
based upon the common law and not legislative intent. The rule
of common law abatement was not an issue in Hammond because the plaintiffs spouse was only disabled and, therefore,
able to assert a claim for punitive damages. In addition, the
court carefully pointed out that the right to common law punitive damages was not an issue in Churchill since punitive dam92
ages were provided by statute.
In the earlier opinion of Chidesterv. Cagwin,93 a unanimous
court pointed out that legislative intent is not an issue where the
remedy is based upon a "separate and distinct" Saunders action
provided at common law. After quoting extensively from Saunders and later cases, the appellate court in Chidester reasoned
that where the party asserts a legal liability due to the acts of
the tortfeasor, that party has an independent cause of action for
the medical and funeral expenses.9 This action is premised on

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 139, 383 N.E.2d at 934 (emphasis added).
97 Ill.
2d 195, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983).
Id. at 210, 454 N.E.2d at 219.
Id.
Id. at 210, 454 N.E.2d at 212.
76 Ill.
App. 2d 477, 222 N.E.2d 274 (1966).
Id. at 483, 222 N.E.2d 278.
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the rationale that the burden should fall on the wrongdoer and
not the innocent victim. Furthermore, the court asserted that
the legislative intent of the act involved was irrelevant as this
action was separate and distinct from the statute. 95
Neither abatement nor punitive damages are favored descendants of the law. The allowance of punitive damages is narrowly limited to intentional or malicious torts and conduct
which exhibits a conscious disregard or utter indifference for
the rights of the public. 96 Where corporations are defendants,
the wrongful conduct of employees is not imputed to the corporation unless the conduct is that of the corporate management. 97
Common law abatement, however, has also been repeatedly
condemned by the Illinois Supreme Court over the past twenty
years. According to the court in McDaniel v. Bullard,98 "[t]he
rule of abatement has its roots in archaic conceptions of remedy
which have long since lost their validity. The reason having
ceased the rule is out of place and ought not to be perpetuated." 99 Ten years later, in Murphy v. Martin Oil,10 0 the
supreme court once again condemned the rule of abatement using the same language quoted above in Bullard.101 As recently
as 1982, the supreme court, in the unanimous opinion of Walter
v. Board of Education of Quincy School District,10 2 quoted the
10 3
identical language from Bullard and Murphy with approval.
Abatement by death should be directly challenged by the Illinois bar and finally interred by the supreme court, under the
common law.
CONCLUSION

The doctrine of judicial restraint has been asserted by such
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Oakview New Lenox School v. Ford Motor Co., 61 IM.App.
3d 194, 378 N.E.2d 544 (1978) (to justify an award of punitive damages, positive misconduct or conduct so outrageous as to suggest a total lack of care is
required).
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 1-0 (1977). See also Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.
2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975) (bus
company held liable for its driver's action); Holda v. Kane County, 88 Ill.
App. 3d 522, 410 N.E.2d 552 (1980) (county held negligent for acts of its sheriff); Tolle v. Interstate Sys. Truck Lines, Inc., 42 I. App. 3d 771, 356 N.E.2d
625 (1976) (truck driver and corporate employer).
98. 34 Ill.
2d 487, 216 N.E.2d 140 (1966).
99. Id. at 494, 216 N.E.2d at 144.
100. 56 Ill.
2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
101. Id. at 428-29, 308 N.E.2d at 585.
102. 93 Ill.
2d 101, 442 N.E.2d 870 (1982).
103. Id. at 108, 442 N.E.2d at 873.
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leading jurists as Justices Frankfurter and Cardozo. 1°4 According to Justice Frankfurter, regardless of the public policies or
interests involved, "a judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to
°
enlarge nor to contract it. 105
The courts are merely "the translators of another's command."'1 6 Justice Cardozo believed that
a court could not rewrite a statute even if the change would
yield a more equitable result. A statute, according to Cardozo,
07
must be taken as the court found it.1

The Froud decision is premised upon and in the mainstream of this time-honored doctrine. Statutory interpretation
of the Survival Act, however, does not address the issue of
whether the common law should continue to recognize abatement by death. The Survival Act also should not control
whether a direct common law action for family expense, already
recognized in Saunders,can support a common law claim for punitive damages in view of the rule of common law abatement.
These two issues have yet to be squarely raised before reviewing courts.
Both common law abatement and punitive damages are creations of the common law. Their continued application to the
private and public rights of citizens of this state must ultimately
be defined by the courts. This should be accomplished in light
of current public policy and the rationale supporting each.
The Illinois Supreme Court has not been reluctant to re-examine archaic common law doctrines which have no contemporary rationale.
In recent years, the supreme court has
repeatedly stated that it is willing to review its own rules of law
and abandon them if they are unjust or illogical and recognize
common law alternatives despite legislative inaction. 0 8 Time
after time the Illinois Supreme Court has commented that the
common law rule of abatement by death has no rational basis in
modern society and should not be perpetuated. 0 9 Perhaps the
104. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes,
47 COLuM. L. REv. 527 (1947).
105. Id. at 533.
106. Id. at 534.
107. Id.
108. See Torres v. Walsh, 98 M. 2d 338, 456 N.E.2d 601 (1983) (English
common law doctrine of forum non conveneus adopted by Illinois). In
Torres, the court noted that: "[W]hile in Illinois we are without any statutory authorization we find that such authorization to transfer a case under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens exists at common law, and, therefore,
statutory authorization is unnecessary as it only recognizes and codifies a
right that previously existed at common law." Id. at 347, 456 N.E.2d at 605.
109. See Walter v. Board of Educ. of Quincy Sch. Dist., 93 11. 2d 101, 442
N.E.2d 870 (1982) (use of mandamas instead of the archaic rule of abatement); Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 III. 2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974) (non
use of abatement with Survival statute); McDaniel v. Bullard, 34 11. 2d 487,
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trial bar of this state should be faulted for not directly challenging the common law rule of abatement by death rather than employing the strained legal fictions of "neutral vehicles" and
"conduits" of statutory law.
Massive toxic tort litigation, similar to that in Froud,is a dubious vehicle to raise the issue of equal application of a rule allowing recovery of punitive and exemplary damages. The issue
of "equal protection," however, has been raised as a constitutional challenge with regard to several death statutes."10
In a special concurring opinion in the Froud appellate court
decision, Justice Sullivan pointed out the concern for the cumulative application of such damages in mass tort litigation."'
Other issues regarding common law punitive damages that have
not been addressed by Illinois courts were also suggested in
Sullivan's concurring opinion." 2 These issues exist whether the
victim is only injured or dies as a result of his injuries. Undoubtedly these issues will be resolved in subsequent appeals re-examining common law principles. Hopefully, these important
issues will not be determined based upon whether the victim is
alive or dead, or whether the General Assembly has continued
in its failure to provide for punitive damages under either the
Wrongful Death or Survival Acts.
The common law right to punitive damages was directly
passed upon by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the recent decision of Wangen v. Ford Motor Co.1 13 In Wangen, the court ignored the separate or derivative test. In Illinois, a purely
derivative cause of action, such as loss of consortium, does not
give rise to an independent claim for punitive damages. 1 4 According to the Wisconsin court, "[t]he objectives of punitive
216 N.E.2d 140 (1966) (court rejected to abate action under Wrongful Death
Act).
110. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Near Chicago, IlM. 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir.)
(statutes which deny punitive damages in wrongful death but allow such
damages in other personal injury actions do not run afoul of the federal
Constitution), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878(1981); In re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d
1315 (9th Cir. 1980) (California's disallowance in wrongful death actions was
rational, and thus disallowance of such damages was valid under both the
federal and state constitutions), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 976 (1980); Cyr v. B.
Often & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (limiting the amount which an estate may recover is not a violation of the federal Constitution where the
state legislature made a rational distinction between damages that go to the
injured party himself and damages that go to the estate).
111. Froud v. Celotex Corp., 107 I. App. 3d 654, 659, 437 N.E.2d 910, 914
(1982) (Sullivan, J., concurring), rev'd, 98 Ill. 2d 324, 456 N.E.2d 131 (1983).
112. Id. at 661, 437 N.E.2d at 915 (Sullivan, J., concurring).
113. 97 Wis. 2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980) (lawsuit brought against car
manufacturer and others as a result of automobile accident in which the
fuel tank exploded).
114. See Churchill v. Norfolk &W. Ry., 73 Ill. 2d 127, 383 N.E.2d 929 (1978).
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damages are served by allowing recovery of such damages in
connection with both types of claims. 111 5 The court determined
that there were no sound reasons for treating the two claims differently. 116 Under the Illinois rule, a claim for loss of consortium
is as clearly derivative as a claim for family expenses is clearly
independent and separate.
The acknowledged inequity of the discredited common law
rule of abatement has created controversy in the court and legislative assemblies for over a hundred years. The conflict of statutes and interstitial interpretation by the courts have only
tended to create exceptions within exceptions to a court- created doctrine whose only reason for existence is its own longevity. According to Justice Holmes, "Jilt is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."117 Once
the rule of common law abatement by death is finally and totally
interred, the court can establish consistent rules for the uniform
application of punitive and exemplary damages.

115. Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 318, 294 N.W.2d at 465.
116. Id.
117. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HAv. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).

